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The subject of this essay is the dialectic between word and thought. Between the word 
and the thought there is therefore no priority of one over the other, but mutual 
presupposition and a perpetual overlapping: it is at this level that the link between word 
and thought is actually affected by creativity. Between thought and word there has 
always implicitly been an original complicity that makes it impossible to separate the 
two dimensions, thought and expression. Therefore language appears as an inner 
dimension that is incarnated in expression giving shape to the unrepresentable; it is not 
merely a sum of positive elements added to each other, but a series of diachronic 
relations; the linguistic sign cannot be seen as having one definite, univocal meaning, 
but it is in the gaps and in the opposition between signs that all language becomes 
meaningful.  Language is a constant work-in-progress, which cannot be schematised 
and viewed in static form. It is an equilibrium in incessant movement between signs 
and signs, living and dynamic,  and is continually being renewed. It is about what is 
said: talking does not finish in what is said, but in what is said the talking is captured 
and held. As far as language is concerned, if it is the relation between signs that gives 
each sign meaning, then meaning arises from their overlapping as well as from the 
gaps between words; meaning lies in the verbal chain since it stands against other 
signs; its sense is an integral part of language; words always operate on a background 
of words, and it is never anything but a fold in the vast fabric of speaking. In the light of 
contemporary philosophical thinking, language is to be seen as a set of margins 
between signs and meanings, in a process of continual revelation, in a transformation 
of contents that generate other contents. The assumption is that in language there is 
something problematic, the coexistence of the logical level with the pragmatic one, in a 
continuous movement that cannot be stopped in signs. In this sense, it is right to call it 
the unsayable, the ungraspable. Language lives precisely due to and on this constant 
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Le présent essai a pour thème la dialectique entre parole et pensée. Aucune priorité de 
l'une sur l'autre, mais une présupposition réciproque et une perpétuelle invasion: c'est 
à ce niveau que la créativité traverse le lien qui les unit. Entre parole et pensée existe, 
depuis toujours, une complicité originelle rendant impossible la séparation entre 
pensée et expression. Les arguments s'intéressent au parler, c'est-à-dire au fait de 
s'exprimer; le langage est considéré comme activité propre à l'homme; l'expression, 
mise en acte par l'homme, consiste à donner forme et présence au réel et à l'irréel. Le 
langage est thématisé comme une intériorité qui s'incarne dans l'expression, donnant 
forme au non représentable qui, loin d'être une simple somme d'éléments positifs 
ajoutés les uns aux autres, consiste dans une série de rapports diacritiques, le signe 
linguistique ne peut être pensé comme ayant un signifié défini et univoque, mais se 
trouve plutôt dans ces écarts et ces oppositions entre les signes que le langage rend 
signifiants. La réflexion philosophique contemporaine propose le langage comme un 
ensemble d'écarts entre signes et significations, dans un processus de révélations 
continuelles, dans une transformation des contenus qui produisent d'autres contenus. 
On part du principe que le langage contient quelque chose de problématique, la 
coexistence du niveau logique et de celui pragmatique, dans un mouvement continu 
qui ne peut s'arrêter aux signes: dans ce sens, il s'agit, à proprement parler, de 
l'indicible, l'ineffable. C'est justement par et de cette constante aspiration  dire 
l'indicible, à assimiler en soi l'ineffable, que vit le langage. 
 
 
La tematica del presente saggio è la dialettica tra  parola e pensiero. Non c’è priorità 
dell’uno sull’altra, ma reciproca presupposizione e perpetuo sconfinamento: è a questo 
livello che il nesso parola/pensiero è effettivamente attraversato dalla creatività. Tra 
pensiero e parola è da sempre implicita una complicità originaria che rende impossibile 
una separazione delle due dimensioni, quella del pensiero e quella dell’espressione. Si 
argomenta intorno al parlare che è un esprimere, il linguaggio è considerato come 
un’attività dell’uomo, l’esprimere attuato dall’uomo consiste nel dare presenza e figura 
al reale e all’irreale. Il linguaggio è  tematizzato come una interiorità che si presentifica 
nell’espressione dando forma all’irrapresentabile, esso non è una semplice somma di 
elementi positivi che si aggiungono l’uno all’altro, ma una serie di rapporti diacritici, il 
segno linguistico non può essere pensato come avente un significato definito e 
univoco, ma è piuttosto negli scarti e nella opposizioni tra i segni che il linguaggio tutto 
si fa significante. La riflessione filosofica contemporanea propone  il linguaggio come 
insieme di scarti tra segni e significazioni, in un processo di svelamento continuo, in 
una trasformazione di contenuti che generano altri contenuti. L’assunto è che nel 
linguaggio vi è qualcosa di problematico, la coesistenza del livello logico con quello 
pragmatico, in un continuo movimento, che non può essere fermato nei segni, e in tal 
senso, è propriamente l’indicibile, l’inafferrabile. Il linguaggio vive proprio per e di 
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What does speaking mean? General opinion will certainly respond that speaking is the 
activity of the organs of speech and hearing. Speaking means phonetically expressing 
and communicating the impulses of the human soul. These are guided  by thoughts. 
Using this definition of language, three things are taken for granted as being true: 
firstly, speaking is expressing. The idea of language as expression is the most 
common one. It presupposes an inner state that is being expressed. Viewing language 
as expression means seeing it in its external guise, precisely in the act that explains 
expression as stemming from an inner state. Secondly, language is considered an 
activity of man. Therefore we cannot say “language speaks”, since this would equate to 
stating that it is language that gives man being. Seen in this light,  man would be a 
premise of language. Lastly, the expressing done by man consists of giving the real 
and the unreal a presence and an image (M. Heidegger, tr. it. 1993: 29). 
 
We talk in our sleep and when we are awake, we are always talking, 
even «when we don’t utter a word, but simply listen or read, even when we 
are not listening or reading, but engaged in a task or relaxing in idleness. We 
talk because talking is part of us» (Ivi, 27). 
Speaking means expressing and communicating the impulses of the 
human soul, which are guided by thoughts. 
The word that expresses thought is already an initial intrinsic 
deformation of that thought, which in its unexpressed purity, would be 
nothing. What is expressed does not exist either, outside what expresses it, 
but expressing is still different from what is expressed, and cannot be 
confused with it.   
Between the word and the thought there is therefore no priority of 
one over the other, but mutual presupposition and a perpetual overlapping: it 
is at this level that the link between word and thought is actually affected by 
creativity. Between thought and word there has always implicitly been an 
original complicity that makes it impossible to separate the two dimensions, 
thought and expression: «thought and word anticipate each other, they 
constantly replace each other. Every thought comes from the word and 
returns to it, every word is born in thoughts and finishes there.  Among men, 
and in each of them there is an incredible flourishing of words, of which 
thoughts are the framework» (M. Merleau-Ponty, tr. it. 1967: 40). 
 
If the word presupposed the thought, if speaking meant first of all accessing the object 
through an intention of knowledge or a representation, one would not understand why 
thought seeks expression as its goal, because the most familiar object seems indefinite 
until we find a name for it, because even the thinking subject is in a sort of ignorance of 
his own thoughts until he has formulated them for himself or written or said them, as is 
shown by the example of many writers who start a book without knowing exactly what 
they are going to narrate. A thought that was content to live for itself beyond the 
difficulties of words and communication, would fall into unconsciousness as soon as it 
appeared, so it would not exist even for itself (M. Merleau-Ponty, tr. it. 1965: 247-248). 
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On the basis of this definition of language three things are 
considered certain: speaking is expressing, language is regarded as an 
activity of man, and man’s expressing consists of giving presence and form to 
the real and the unreal. 
Therefore language appears as an inner dimension that is 
incarnated in expression giving shape to the unrepresentable; it is not merely 
a sum of positive elements added to each other, but a series of diachronic 
relations; the linguistic sign cannot be seen as having one definite, univocal 
meaning, but it is in the gaps and in the opposition between signs that all 
language becomes meaningful.   
Language is a constant work-in-progress, which cannot be 
schematised and viewed in static form. It is an equilibrium in incessant 
movement between signs and signs, living and dynamic,  and is continually 
being renewed. It is about what is said: talking does not finish in what is said, 
but in what is said the talking is captured and held. 
 
L’idée existe au-delà de lui comme la petite phrase au-delà de son exécution ou 
“apparition“ […] Voir = réversibilité du voyant et du visible, penser = réversibilité de la 
Parole opérante et du [x] nommable1. 
  
As far as language is concerned, if it is the relation between signs 
that gives each sign meaning, then meaning arises from their overlapping as 
well as from the gaps between words; meaning lies in the verbal chain since 
it stands against other signs; its sense is an integral part of language; words 
always operate on a background of words, and it is never anything but a fold 
in the vast fabric of speaking.  
 
To understand language we cannot look up some internal lexicon that will give us, for 
the words and the forms, the pure thoughts they should correspond to: all we need is to 
give ourselves to its life, to its movement of differentiation and articulation, to its 
eloquent gesticulation. There is therefore opacity in language: it is never interrupted to 
leave space for pure meaning, it is never limited unless it be by another language and 
its meaning is always set in words. Like a charade, it can only be understood by the 
interaction of signs, each of which, taken in isolation, is either unclear or banal: only 
together do they make sense (M. Merleau-Ponty, tr. it. 1967: 66-67). 
 
The opacity of language enables us to have a language that is really 
able to communicate: what makes language opaque  and clouds its 
transparency, is not a limitation of language but is in fact what makes it alive 
and inexhaustible.  
«Idée d’une expression jamais achevée»2. 
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Meaning is, in a way, coextensive to language in its entirety; it is not 
distinguished from language but is there, totally immersed in it. At this level, 
there occurs something similar to what happens in painting, where rather 
than being expressed by the picture, the meaning impregnates the picture. 
Language does not express a meaning, but it is actually the 
meaning that permeates and impregnates language, and the original 
dimension is a kind of huge fabric from which, like endless folds, can emerge 
the multiplicity of direct speech.      
Construing the communicative universe therefore means giving 
voice to the tensive lines that shape language from within, pushing the limits 
of language without completely breaking the structural constraints, to try in 
vain to create a kind of foreign language within one’s own language.  
Language does not subside into a static state, being constantly 
pushed beyond its limits by the inner forces that give life to it. Beneath the 
conceptual meaning of words there is an existential meaning. 
Meaning is a dynamic object created intersubjectively and having a 
phenomenological dimension that is involved in every encounter.  This is in 
contrast to the classical cognitive approaches that see meaning as an 
intrinsic property of certain language forms.  Language evolves on the basis 
of the transformations of the natural and social context in which they happen 
to live. These modifications are perceived and expressed in language, which 
is not a reality complete unto itself, a sort of absolute subject of forms of life 
and of tradition, but something closely connected to the context in which it is 
determined and which,  thanks to its typical symbolic elaboration, it helps to 
determine.  
We need to add another interpretative category to the threesided 
communication situation analysed by Davidson, Peirce and Wittgenstein. 
This is the category of common feeling. In the constitution of language as 
process, we can identify the space of common feeling, which is the space 
where one is with others in the world. But while this theoretical orientation 
adds to the debate the important idea of the constitution of the language 
process and of its situated-ness in communicative relations, the context of 
analysing the language process must be broadened and not restricted to the 
subjectivity of sender and receiver, since if language were locked between 
these two, the process itself would be objectivised and limited to the 
relational exchange.  
In the light of contemporary philosophical thinking, language is to be 
seen as a set of margins between signs and meanings, in a process of 
continual revelation, in a transformation of contents that generate other 
contents. The assumption is that in language there is something problematic, 
the coexistence of the logical level with the pragmatic one, in a continuous 
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movement that cannot be stopped in signs. In this sense, it is right to call it 
the unsayable, the ungraspable. Language lives precisely due to and on this 
constant aspiration to say the unsayable, to take into oneself the 
ungraspable. 
But if we move one step at a time, in language there is on the one 
hand its logical form and on the other hand the construction of a set of 
relations between the language expressions and the entities that help to 
make up the semantic contents of utterances. And it is in this second phase 
that semantics takes up what was bequeathed by ontology. In the concrete 
determinations inherent to the discourse, we see the inadequacy of a vision 
of the phenomenon of language seen as a mere system, and the need to go 
beyond the structuralist approach in a perspective that can account for the 
capacity, typical of discourse, to transcend the system in order to refer to the 
world.     
The semantic approach therefore finds confirmation on the level of 
reflection where by interpreting the symbols encountered in existence, the 
self-interpreting subject  will no longer be the Husserlian and Cartesian 
cogito, but in the words of Ricoeur, an existent being that discovers (P. 
RICOEUR, tr. it. 1977: 14-16). And this is the phenomenological dimension in 
which language is placed. In this phenomenological perspective we find a 
field of signification that is prior to any objectivity; meaning is found to 
originate in the phenomenological dimension of the intersubjective space.  
This opens the  way to going beyond idealism, beyond the subject 
locked in his system of signification, in order to affirm the worldliness of man 
as a living being, the boundaries of whose intentionality are the whole world.  
And it is precisely because using a phenomenological approach in 
our reasoning makes us reflect on the world and on our way of being with 
others, that it is useful to reflect on the world that is being referred to, in which 
every “thing” is not locked in on itself  but is part of a context which brings 
many relations together into a single figure.  
At the centre is the concept of relation, no longer in the sense of a 
closed circle, but seen  as a movement that stays inexorably open and 





The relation between activity and passivity 
 
This is the relation between activity and passivity based on which 
there is a rethinking of the ontology of the Whole as hollow fullness, a 
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plurality made up of finite sharing/dividing. This brings into question the clear 
separation between the perceiving subject and the perceived object, between 
the subject’s activity and at the same time its passivity. 
And this is the complex path leading straight back to the 
investigation of the world’s inner relational modalities, in order to discover 
their interweaving with the sensitive substratum, the sediment of the world, 
and thus reveal the latter as a “system of equivalences” which is “already 
there”, prior to any explicit ideation. In other words this investigation concerns 
identities that are no longer the finished product, namely the clearly defined 
integral forms of a relation between elements that are already given and are 
confined within the borders of a pre-established, separate individuality, but 
identities that arise due to and out of the relation with all others. To 
paraphrase Merleau-Ponty,  “each is what others see of it”. 
Moreover, meaning is not only experience of the world, but 
experience with others. This leads us to recognise the fact that every being is 
for the others that surround it and look at it and that its existence means 
communicating with others, being-with. This being-with explains why, rather 
than being a synthetically organised objective grouping, or a multiplicity of 
objects beside each other,  the world is in fact a system of concordances and 
of inherent concordances, i.e. a network of relational exchanges all referring 
to each other. 
The ontological inclination of this argument leads to the following 
analogy: just as the body also sees itself and in so doing becomes light 
revealing to the visible what is within it and achieving the segregation of the 
internal and external, so the word, supported by language’s many ideal 
relations, is a certain region of the universe of meanings  “it is both the organ 
and resonator of all the others and, due to this, is coextensive to the 
thinkable. The word is a total part of the significations like the flesh of the 
visible, as it is in relation to Being through a being, and lastly, as it is 
narcissistic, eroticised, endowed with a natural magic that lures other 
significations into its net in the same way as the body feels the world by 
feeling itself”(M. Merleau-Ponty, tr. it. 1964: 141).  
Therefore, although it is seen as a dynamic object, what is 
investigated is no longer the word, but the region of the word. The word 
expands into the invisible and with it the body’s belonging to being and the 
bodily relevance of every being are extended to semantic operations.  
So in this new ontology, the linguistic process is interwovern with the 
interlocutor’s process of consciousness. But how does language express this 
movement? How can the really existing be brought into language?  
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Language represents the subject’s taking a stance in the world of its 
meanings and in itself holds an inner dimension, but this is not a closed and 
self-conscious thought. 
 Language tries to express the drives of the real through allusions 
and interweavings, multiplying the relational threads of meaning.  For 
example for the speaking subject and for those listening to him, the making of 
sounds brings about a certain structuring of experience, a certain modulation 
of existence.  The system of sounds and definite words is decentered in the 
discourse, breaks down and is reorganised according to a pattern that is 
revealed to the speaker and the listener at the very moment the 
communication is underway.    
This is the journey towards language, in which every change taking 
place in the language’s essential words determines at the same time, the 
change in the way things and the world reveal themselves to man3. 
Corresponding to the system of words, of signs forming the visible 
side of language, there is the invisible side, the hidden framework. Language 
lives of the impossibility of saying what one would like to say, it revolves 
around a deep cavity without which language itself would not exist, and 
having retrieved the pragmatic nature of meaning, it becomes language in 
action. And this is shown even more clearly in the figurative sense 
accompanying language: a frown, a gulp, a sigh,….give meaning to the 
language outside of ourselves, and trascend its rigid patterns of words. This 
is visual sound, conveyed from the sender to the receiver, in which the word 
becomes: “the echo of the bare figure resounding in the open depths” (J.L. 
NANCY, tr. it. 2004: 8). The word region, as an echo, is not confined to a 
single “sound” that resonates in the depths of the individual, not closed but 
open to receiving and recreating.  
If we follow these arguments we come upon perspectives to make 
us reflect, leading to the redefining of the process of construing meaning 
through the lens of phenomenology: the symbol cannot be interpreted or 
reduced to a mere sign, but rather it must be acknowledged that its 
interpretation is unending. It is a point in the construction and development of 
the hermeneutical circle. Language is not exclusively an operation of the 
intelligence, or an exclusive motor phenomenon; it is wholly motor and wholly 
intelligence; it holds a very broad, complex meaning and is not reduced to the 
operations and systems of signification.  
To paraphrase Heidegger: everything is language, insofar as it is the 
abode of Being, the essence of Being; however our relation with language is 
uncertain, obscure, almost impossible to express; in various ways, speaking 
arises from the “unspoken”, whether this be something not yet expressed or 
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something that must remain unexpressed in that it is a reality that eludes 
words.  
Following these thoughts we can see the interconnection between 
the spoken and something that eludes words: not only something that has not 




The communicative dimension 
 
The conceptual level of language, composed of figures, purely ideal-
conventional signs, therefore falls in a communicative dimension in a network 
of shared actions, which involves all the subjects participating in the 
conversation, and expresses their reciprocal acting, their relating to each 
other and moving–towards-each-other. In this communicative dimension 
meaning is always a process. It is the co-feeling situation among the 
subjects, in which understanding is achieved. 
The communicative approach has contributed to the development of 
the concept of language and communication. The communicative relation is 
an exchange not only of contents but also of semantic, grammatical or 
pragmatic categories or of language functions. This complex perspective 
takes on a relational power, in that it presupposes and suggests the relation, 
creating space for reflection and for the interlocutors’ co-responsibility within 
the place where it is carried out.    
Communication is achieved in a sliding of meanings between the 
interlocutors, in filigree there emerges the importance of the pragmatic side of 
language: to have real understanding one needs to immerse oneself in the 
concrete use of language, in the meaningful slipping that the interlocutors 
impose on terms.  
Consequently the origins of meaning are not to be found in a 
cognitive system, or in a socially isolated subject, but in an intersubjective 
space. We might add that the process is continuous; it is the revelation and 
plurality of sense, and the unsayable in the relating of experiences. 
Getting down to the substance of the question, there is the attempt 
to give meaning back to the depth of existence. The critical reflection that 
opens up tries to bring meaning down from the pedestal of individual creation 
to involve it in the tormented adventure of existence, in communicative 
intersubjectivity influenced by the context, as internalised social resources. 
And it is precisely by bringing into play this type of problems that the need 
arises to rethink the chiasm  between context and language in a new way. 
And this is the path outlined as an alternative to the classical cognitive 
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approaches that conceive of meaning as the intrinsic property of certain 
language forms.  
In the light of the analysis made so far, in this system of relations, in 
this relational key – or in a system of relations in which we ourselves are 
held, insofar as we are made up of them - in this pre-objective_framework (M. 
Merleau-Ponty, 1969: 268), meaning turns out to be not a mere construct, 
though formed in the phenomenological experience, but in constant 
transformation. The hermeneutics of the symbol is opened up, keeping 
phenomenology engaged in dialogue with the philosophy of thought 
generated by the Cartesian cogito. In other words, reflection and 
interpretation are two complementary moments in a hermeneutical journey 
that integrates cogito with the awareness that man’s concrete situation is not 
just that of being the centre of his existence, but also of being in the world of 
others.      
These are the philosophical implications of the conception of 
situated meaning. 
The words, the vowels, the phonemes from an analysis that 
considers not just the meaning of words as concepts and terms, but also the 
emotional sense as ways of singing the world «and they are destined to 
represent objects not because of an objective resemblance, as was believed 
by the naïve theory of onomatopoeia, but because they bring out and, 
properly speaking,  they express the emotional essence […]. The 
preponderance of vowels in one language, of consonants in another, the 
systems of construction and syntax should not be arbitrary conventions to 
express the same thought, but more ways for the human body to celebrate 
the world and, ultimately, to experience it» (M. Merleau-Ponty 1967: 258-
259). 
This is a communicative dimension in which signs are already 
themselves the meaning, and the latter is entirely absorbed in the concrete 
gestural-expression situated in the sender-receiver relationship: «la parole 
porte toute idée et devient elle-même une idée»4. It is not the complete 
achievement of language that one must seek, it is not towards the 
determination of the weight of words, but the thought of these “fields of 
thought”, as places where communication is «faire renaître dans l’esprit 
d’autrui moyennant signes extérieurs une conception qui ètait dans celui de 
l’auteur. Deux sujets pensants et des signes»5.  
The way sign systems work conveys a particular relationship with 
reality. 
The relationship of signs finds an objective underpinning in the 
social relations between individuals and the world around them. Generally 
speaking, casting light on the laws of language means comparing the 
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structural conditions of expression with the settings where it develops, with 
the reasons and rules of its genesis, with the multiple settings in which 
experience gains meaning.   Once it has been verified that this deep need of 
semiotics matches and melds with Husserl’s legitimate demand to investigate 
“the way the life world acts as an underpinning”, we have the solution to the 
riddle which says for man “there is constantly a pre-scientific world” which is 
pre-linguistic and pre-meaning. It is then easy to realise that this attempt at a 
radical foundation exhausts itself in the blind alleys of an idealistic approach, 
which entrusts absolute subjectivity with the extreme task of construing the 
meaning of the world. One achieves however an effective explanatory 
capacity when semiotic observation, which holds that the basis of 
generalisation and idealisation finds its roots in the typical relations that 
objectively take place in social life showing the articulation of language and 
real action. This calls into play, in other words, the real configuration of the 
actual work of language, making up language acts. Basically one can talk 
about producing sense only when one takes man’s production into concrete 
consideration; man starts to make sense of reality, he places between 
himself and reality the intelligible-significant realm, when he triggers the 
dialectics of his own production. The significant , like the intelligible, entails a 
coming to awareness which gives expression to the significations passively 
preconstituted in the real work carried out in the life world.  
In the perspective of this argument, the communicative dimension 
needs to start from relations and dialogue to be able to construct the 





Communication in the class context  
 
The constant presence of the relation between a communicative 
way of acting and the context can be seen when observing communication at 
school. 
The initial assumption is that interaction in teaching-learning is «a 
construction of a shared space within which an agreement can be negotiated 
as the outcome of the participants’ capacity to dialogue  and relate» (D. 
Coppola, 2008). 
In this space of interlocutory co-responsibility, communication is not 
just competence and language event, but it is the construction of a shared 
meaning and communicative action (J. Habermas, tr. it. 1997). 
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The dialogic perspective tends to give depth to things, to make them 
more complex. It  presupposes and suggests exchange through relating. 
Placing dialogue at the basis of the teaching/learning process means 
creating, within lessons, spaces for reflection and interlocutory co-
responsibility. In this context communicative competence is required in every 
kind of language event, in order to consider the teaching/learning process an 
«active construction of theoretical-practical knowledge (knowing and knowing 
how to), of tools, values and ways of being, all the outcome of the negotiation 
of meanings and a reflection of the ways of being and complex dynamics that 
are not only personal but also socio-cultural» (D. Coppola, 2008: 36). 
The teacher’s communicative style is also reflected in the choice of 
linguistic-cultural models. This choice should be oriented towards a pluri-
normative didactics; in other words it should pay attention to linguistic-cultural 
diversification and to the development of the ability to use the language in 
different contexts.  
In short, «all behaviour is communication and all communication 
influences behaviour» (P.Watzlawick, J. Helmick Beavin, Don D. 
Jackson, 1971). 
Overall, the conversational network is characterised by a way of 
acting in which the actors are systematically led to: 
- identify the shared aims to be achieved, 
- understand and justify the various actions performed, 
- understand and influence the communicative strategies in a 
cooperative direction, 
- assimilate the most common kinds of discourse that act as 
constraints on the speaker’s subsequent choice, 
- negotiate and re-negotiate purposes and aims in view of the 
communicative exchange, 
- coordinate the reciprocal actions to maintain the stability of the 
system of interactions, 
- produce a change in the initial situation by changing entrenched 
interpretative patterns, 
- elaborate new shared meanings.  
The teacher asks how the communicative actions expressed can be 
applied to school education. There is no doubt that promoting this 
communicative attitude must become an aim for the teacher to pursue 
systematically and coherently in his/her role in charge of the managing the 
class group. In the communicative perspective put forward here, this 
management becomes essentially a real task of animating the class, where 
the style adopted by the teacher in relating to students or to the group is 
essential if certain aims are to be achieved.  
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The school as an institution visibly and practically takes cognitive 
socialisation as its primary aim.  
The life of the class involves a series of decisions. The teacher’s 
intervention, which has the task of leading the group to achieve its objectives, 
can be placed on the level of action or of behaviour to be promoted. For 
instance,  the subject or the group is told what it must and can do: here ‘can’ 
and ‘must’ are functions of a hierarchically higher position, the 
communication network is usually one-way and is limited to situations where 
precise information or instructions  are given, decision-making is reserved for 
the leader, in virtue of the expertise that characterises him/her concerning the 
aim to be achieved. It therefore becomes very likely that the communication 
network is expressed through the participants’ passivity, adaptation or 
opposition to this behaviour. 
Communication in class is connected to asymmetric interaction, and 
often adopts the pedagogic aim of reducing this asymmetry. Research has 
shown that the teacher’s communicative style can affect the pupils’ behaviour 
and their school results, which makes us think about the passage from a 
strictly asymmetrical interaction framework to a less rigid communicative style 
in which the teacher takes the role of moderator rather than director, or where 
there are the features of an educational relationship centred on dialogue and 
on processes of co-construction of knowledge (R. Titone, 1988; C. 
Pontecorvo (a cura di), 2005; F. Orletti, 2005). The capacity to establish 
relations, to interact with the class group, to consciously and effectively 
communicate one’s needs, are not only all elements at the basis of a good 
educational relationship, but also a competence that the educational 
relationship must be able to promote so that it is acquired, since it constitutes 
the premise for the pupils’  successful participation in the training and 
educational contexts they will encounter in the future. The class-group is the 
basic structure through which the school organisation pursues the 
institutional objectives of the “systematic, planned acquisition of knowledge, 
but also constitutes the domain in which individual needs are displayed, 
differing from  institutional ones (for instance the need to have friendships, to 
gain prestige or to give vent to aggressiveness)» (R. Carli e A. Mosca, 1980: 
69). The latter aspect, defined as a sub-institutional level, is a profound 
feature of the process of socialisation and is often considered by teachers to 
be the area where problems are manifested in relations between teaching 
staff and students.   On the other hand the teacher cannot always correctly 
understand the quantity and quality of the interpersonal relations that are set 
up within a class. In the gap between the perception of the teacher and the 
real social status of the pupils, we can identify one of the factors that has a 
negative effect on the construction of adequate, gratifying teacher-pupil 
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relations.  So the failure to recognise needs and the inadequate expression of 
needs emerging at this level can lead to a difficult, dysfunctional integration of 
the class-group, and consequently have a negative effect on the primary 
learning process.  
There is a vast literature that underlines the fact that the quality of 
the educational relationship is the indispensable seedbed for the acquisition 
of capacities and competences in the various areas of knowledge. This is a 
widely held belief among teachers, but these same teachers are not always 
placed in a position to gain the tools for monitoring, managing, verifying, and 
developing the quality of the educational relationship. While teachers on the 
one hand are able to perceive, often in advance, situations of uneasiness 
amongst pupils and with pupils, they often do not have the professional 
know-how to deal successfully with problems and critical aspects. Scholars 
seem almost totally in agreement in assigning the role of “discourse 
management” to teachers at all levels of schooling from nursery to secondary 
school, and also in underlining the essentially phonological nature of much 
academic teaching, not only in lectures, but also in seminar work.  In the 
observation of a typical school lesson, what emerges are rigidly 
asymmetrical, predictable  exchanges and pre-established situations, with 
stereotyped roles (A. Cilberti, R. Pugliese, L. Anderson, 2006). 
On the other hand it must be pointed out that interest in relating and 
in the communication of the class group is not usually part of the teacher’s 
training and at any rate it is too ambitious an aim to be dealt with without an 
adequate documentation on these dynamics. The problem is that, more and 
more often, teachers today find themselves facing modes of communicating 
and relating that are incompatible with the structure that teachers try to give 
their teaching practice; there is a significant mismatch between the expected 
behaviours and the actual behaviours, which express apathy, disinterest, 
closure and at times an attitude of defiance, of intolerance, lack of respect 
even inside the classroom. Now, when in a strictly structured social context 
like that of the class we see a progressive deterioration of the relational 
fabric, when communication becomes ineffective, when there is the 
systematic defiance and criticism of the delicate relationship between the 
teacher’s authority and the pupil’s freedom, the overall balance of the 
fundamental teaching-learning relationship tips inevitably towards the 
negative side. All this is generally associated with a situation of great stress 
for the teachers, who find it hard to see a way out, in professional and 
personal terms,  in their teaching practice. The pupil’s distress is therefore 
accompanied by that of the teacher, whose function appears, not only to the 
teacher but also to society, to have been suddenly stripped of its usefulness 
and meaning6. 
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We see that when the behaviour of the class group or of single 
pupils differs significantly from what can be called with some precision the 
acceptability threshold, and becomes repetitive and structured, it is the 
symptom of an uneasiness in the pupil/teacher relationship which must be 
dealt with using methods appropriate to the difficulty of the task.  
Essentially, we need to rely on the resources typical of the teacher’s 
role which until now has always been played out on a mainly (if not 
exclusively) disciplinary plane and which today must also rely on the field of 
the educational relationship. The cognitive and social aspects of learning are 
closely tied to the various forms of communication and cooperation existing in 
every class between teachers and students.  
Each class is a specific community, in which, while relating, the 
individuals construct their own linguistic and communicative tools; though 
they share the same language, the use to which it is put depends largely on 
the rules they share for producing and interpreting every communicative 
event. For this reason each class is the unit of analysis in which one 
expresses oneself and communication is studied. The role of language 
cannot be seen simply as a way of exchanging information: since 
communication actualises a particular situation whose structure is created in 
the time and  space shared with the other interlocutors, this time/space 
structure is the underpinning of intersubjectivity, which in the decentralisation 
of viewpoints, enables a communicative universe to be constructed.     
Individual differences are fundamental to the processes of co-
constructing knowledge but in a discussion, if they are not commented on 
and emphasised, they may not be noticed by the pupils. This essential task is 
the teacher’s responsibility. Listening to and getting to know the pupils’ way 
of reasoning is fundamental for coping with it.  
In interacting with the pupils, the teacher must offer them 
behavioural models on how to elaborate knowledge and how to be receptive 
and critical of others’ ideas. The strategy of mirroring underpins the 
repetition/reformulation of questions, already expressed by some members of 
the group, in whom the teacher sees the potential to reopen the discussion.  
The activity of mediation typical of teaching makes the child’s 
cognitive action explicit and conscious,  giving the child access to conscience 
and control, which will be mastered little by little. The teacher’s role therefore 
consists of planning and coordinating the activities, encouraging exchanges, 
discussion, making the class into “a learning community” that can be open to 










The main support for this idea is to be found in Ricoeur’s philosophy, 
which holds that the symbol in written texts and speech acts gives one 
something to think about (P. Ricoeur, 1969), since it connects the subject not 
only to his/her own unconscious, but ontologically to the relational universe. 
Every communicative exchange comes about in a frame, which, 
while indicating the specific rules, also allows for a constant control on the 
progress of the conversation, since the frames can be recognised and 
repeated over time, and some of them may even become actual rituals, or 
lead to actual “constants”, that is, to routines.  In the specific school context, 
the latter are found in all kinds of classes - for instance, communication 
during the oral test, the giving of instructions – others are specific to the 
single class and make up a major part of the culture shared by teachers and 
pupils, regulated by the classroom contract.  
Discourse frames, the short sequences made up of «a single type of 
adjacent pairs (“Do you understand?/I understand”), are used systematically 
during the conversation. They serve to fill in over-long pauses, to gain time to 
think, to manage one’s participation without interrupting the thematic 
coherence of the conversation […]. Discourse routines are in fact called the 
main organisers of teaching activity, since they direct the development and 
reduce margins of ambiguity; they are also shared by participants and 
socially acquired» (P. Selleri, 2004: 64-65). 
In this picture, speech acts and behaviours have a performative 
value «by the very fact that they are used, they establish the framework of 
meaning underlying them as the given reality.  In proposing certain teaching 
contents, in the act of presenting it in a certain way, the teacher is declaring 
what it is useful to transmit/learn, what is secondary and what needs to be 
explained; the teacher essentially attributes the status of event of importance 
to certain facts, and rejects others; in so doing he/she defines the area of 
semiotic reference orienting the process of interpretation (that is, of 
identifying as relevant, of selecting, of categorising) which qualifies the pupil’s 
fruition of the message,  and therefore the domain of signification within 
which he/she is to work» (C. Venuleo, S. Salvatore, R. Grassi, P. Mossi, 
2008: 226). 
Language acts are considered actions, as is shown by the 
theoretical work present in the examination of the philosophy of language 
from Wittgenstein to Habermas. Speech belongs to practical and technical 
actions, and is characterised by a communicative purpose. This first 
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characterisation (speaking equals acting, language equals a technique) 
justifies and  specifies what the action must consist of from the pragmatic 
point of view. Though not wholly, this idea largely shares the viewpoint of 
Austin: using the terminology he introduced, we can call specific language 
acts locutions and call language acts locutive acts. All locutive acts have the 
effect of leading the agents taking part in them to irreversible compromise.  
The analysis of the concepts brings out the character of the 
“network” of concepts – like intention, motive, agent – called upon by action, 
showing that each of them draws the diversity of its significations from its 
uses in definite contexts and that the different contexts in turn relate them to 
each other, so one should speak as much about intersignification as about 
signification. The analysis of propositions consists of thinking about the 
logical form of the utterances concerning action. 
We have three different senses or dimensions of the use of an 
utterance, or in general the use of language. 
Locutionary act: approximately equivalent to making a certain 
utterance with a certain meaning and reference, which still equates to the 
“meaning” in the traditional sense.   
Illocutionary act such as informing, ordering, warning, making a 
commitment to do something, etc.,  that is, utterances that have a certain 
force (conventional).  
Perlocutionary act: what we obtain or manage to do by saying 
something, like convincing, presuading, detaining, and even surprising and 
deceiving.  
All three of these kinds of actions are subject, clearly simply as 
actions, to the usual difficulties and reservations about the attempt as 
opposed to success, to being intentional rather than not being so, and so on.    
In other words the locutionary act has meaning, the illocutionary act 
has a certain force in saying something, the perlocutionary act is the 
obtaining of certain effects by saying something. 
The analysis of the speech act (authors like Austin7, Strawson and 
Searle8 provide the theory of “speech acts”) addresses the propositional 
structure, and at this level the analysis does not merely examine the 
reference and the meaning, but “saying which is itself doing”, that is, the 
illocutionary act.  
The unit of discourse is the utterance, which has a meaning, or an 
intent, and the intent is what the speaker wants to say. The sign has the 
function of signifying, but only discourse has the function of communicating.  
In other words, every discourse is performed as an event, but 
understood as meaning. This is possible insofar as language is the place 
where logic rises above psychology, and the place where logic shrinks before 
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the postulation of a reality that makes up the ontological implication of the 
discourse.  
The typical feature of discourse is to depict its speaker through the 
indicators of subjectivity. It therefore becomes possible to state that this very 
self-referential character of discourse admits the speaker’s intention along 
with the force of the discourse in the field of communicability.   
The intentional element comes into play when we move from what 
language does to what the speaker does.  
Austin too stresses the speaker’s self-reference. In the last lessons 
of How to do things with words, he comments that constative utterances also 
have a performative effect.  
«The performative is not so clearly distinguished from the constative 
– the first successful or unsuccessful, the second true or false […]. When 
undertaking the task of finding a list of explicit performative verbs, it seemed 
that it would not always be so easy to distinguish performative from 
constative utterances, and so it seems useful to go back to the basic 
principles  – to consider, starting from the bottom, in how many ways by 
saying something one is doing something, or in saying something one is 
doing something, and also with saying something one is doing something. 
And we started to distinguish a whole meaning group of “doing something” 
which are all included when we say,  as is obvious, that saying something is 
in its full normal sense, doing something – which includes making certain 
sounds, uttering certain words in a particular construction, and uttering them 
with a certain “meaning” in the favoured philosophical sense of these words, 
namely with a certain sense and a certain reference. The name I give the act 
of “saying something” in this full normal sense is a locutionary act, and the 
study of the utterances in this area and from this point of view, I call the study 
of locutions, or of full speech units» (J. Austin, 1955: 52).  
In constatation, I make a commitment in a different way from a 
promise, like that of belief: “I believe in what I say”. With a constative 
utterance, we make an abstraction from the illocutionary aspects of the 
language act, and we concentrate on the locutionary  ones .  
With a performative utterance, we pay the greatest attention to the 
illocutionary force of the utterance, and we make an abstraction of the 
dimension corresponding to facts. 
 
In general the locutionary act, like the illocutionary act, is just an abstraction: every 
authentic speech act is both one and the other (J. Austin, 1955: 52). 
 
It can therefore be seen that the act of locution allows the fixing in 
language of elements considered to be psychological: belief, desire, feeling 
and in general a corresponding mental act. This comment is important for the 
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reference to the speaker. The idea of the speaker’s intention is thus 
reintroduced.  
It is the role of desire and belief to articulate the various meanings of 
“intention to”. On this line Ricoeur arrives at a third sense of intention. I 
cannot promise without intending to produce in the other person the 
recognition that my utterance has the meaning of subjecting me to an 
obligation to do what I say9. 
The content of the communication therefore depends on the 
speakers’ intentions so when a speaker makes a certain utterance, he does 
so with the intention of having a certain effect on the listeners through their 
recognition of his intention.  This discourse, in the area of linguistic 
communication, re-establishes the connection between meaning and 
intention. It results in the equivalence between “meaning” and “intending”. 
As Ricoeur argued, underlying every ‘saying’ there is a “essere-da-
dire” and this is entitled to be brought into language.  Language is 
intentionally open to being because, at the constitutive level, it is a “way of 
being in being”. That is not to say that there is identity between language and 
being. Language distinguishes itself from being, since it presupposes it; in 
other words, there is a non linguistic basis (the non semantic) that precedes 
language and in which language itself is rooted.  
Precisely insofar as it presupposes the ontological dimension, 
language can refer to the human experience in general. Or rather, it can be 
configured and modelled on the latter so as to reproduce it, since there is 
structural identity between the two levels.  Language and the ontological 
plane conform in the sense that they are based on language and that on this 
basis there is a circular relation between experience and language. 
Phenomenology shows that it is being itself that gives the foundation 
and structure to language utterances, which incorporate this structure,  and it 
is precisely because there is structural identity that language can refer to 
experience. This does not mean separating the central theme of 
phenomenology – all consciousness is consciousness of – from the method 
of phenomenology, that is, from the fact that it is an eidetic science 
describing experience. Experience is structured, has a sense and is therefore 
sayable, because it is intentional and it is always possible to explain the 
sense of an experience through the objectivity at which it aims. 
Phenomenology operates at the level of experience while linguistic 
analysis operates at the level of utterances. The former establishes the level 
of constitution, the latter the level of expression. But the two methodologies 
converge insofar as the work of phenomenology is based on linguistic 
analysis and from the latter we can discover the former.  
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The object perceived is already a sense unit presumed liable to be 
annulled during the further appearances of the object. Therefore there is 
meaning before language. Lebenwelt is the experience that precedes 
language. It is reached through an operation carried out in and on language 
in the form of retracing via questioning which enables language in its entirety 
to find its foundation in what is outside language.   
Language contains the reference to something different from the 
self.  
Phenomenology shows that it is being itself that underlies and 
structures language utterances, which incorporate this structure, and it is 
precisely because there is structural identity that language can refer to 
experience.  
The language of action “construes meaning” not in a situation of 
observation, but precisely insofar as it informs action in the transaction 
process that develops between two agents. For this reason the interplay of 
question and answer in which the concepts of intuition and reflection take on 
meaning, is not where protocols are expressed. But analysing ordinary 
language reveals that languages “construe meaning”, even without 
constatation and without entailing verification  
There is, therefore, “sense”, not only in constatation, but also in all 
illocutionary acts, just as there is illocution in a constatation. Giving an order 
or making a promise is to say something about something, but to say it in the 
imperative or in the future indicative etc. 
Ricoeur argues that the crux of meaning lies in “taking the other 
person into account”. The relation between wills10, in conflict or in 
collaboration, is important for any strategy. Action is always in fact a way of 
behaving in relation to another person, of regulating one’s own game against 
the other’s game.    
At this level language works by family resemblances, overlapping, 
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1 «The idea exists beyond language, just as the little phrase exists beyond its execution 
or "apparition" […] See = reversibility of the seer and of the visible, think = reversibility 
of the word in use and [x] nameable», ID., Manuscrits , Vol. VII, f. 203[r], in D. DE LEO,  
La relazione percettiva. La musica. Merleau-Ponty e la musica, Mimesis, Milano 2009, 
p. 106. 
2 «The idea of an expression never achieved», ID., Manuscrits , Vol. III, p. 210; in D. DE 
LEO,  La relazione percettiva. La musica. Merleau-Ponty e la musica,cit., p. 106. As 
Merleau-Ponty underlines, Saussure taught us that if taken in isolation, signs mean 
nothing, in that rather than expressing a meaning, each of them indicates a gap in 
meaning between the self and the other person:  «language is made up of differences 
and not of terms; or rather, in language the terms are generated by the differences that 
appear between them», ID., Il linguaggio indiretto e le voci del silenzio, in ID., Segni, 
cit., pp. 64-115, p. 63. Mauro Carbone makes a highly relevant parallel in his book La 
carne e la voce, between Merleau-Ponty’s idea of flesh and Saussure’s idea of 
language. The starting point of this analysis is the misunderstanding which, in my 
opinion, underlies the critiques of Nancy,  Deleuze and Derrida and which can be 
summed up in two points. Firstly, the view of the flesh as a way of updating that of the 
subject safeguarding its traits of ownership and unity. In other words, the first 
misunderstanding lies in seeing the idea of the flesh as a way of making the body the 
last hiding place for subjectivity. The second misunderstanding lies in the interpretation 
of Merleau-Ponty’s idea of reversibility of meaning as an accomplished reversibility with 
no gaps, such that there is a closure into oneself leading to a sort of confusion which in 
the end would annul any difference. However, the model I believe Merleau-Ponty uses 
when he describes the idea of the flesh is that of the  language he finds in Saussure’s 
linguistics, which holds that language functions as the interaction between different 
signs that can give rise to meaning thanks to their mutual difference. It is therefore on 
this conception of the differences that, as such, produce identity, that Merleau-Ponty’s 
concept of the flesh is based, along with – obviously - his characterisation of 
reversibility.  It is following the moral curve that the discourse adopts, according to 
Merleau-Ponty’s arguments against the conceptions of language that emerge in both 
empiricism and intellectualism, that Levin’s thought is articulated: «for our purposes 
here there is no need for a detailed repetition of Merleau-Ponty’s arguments against 
this philosophy of language. For us what will be important is his phenomenologically 
generated topology of embodied experience. Specifically, we will be concerned with 
the possibility of relating the articulation of this topology to a process of self-reflection – 
a process that essentially involves a memory supported by the body, a “Proustian” 
memory – where the correspondence intrinsic to the syntony between our bodily 
experience and language is retrieved and raised to the level of a moral responsibility», 
M. CARBONE, D. M. LEVIN, La carne e la voce. In dialogo tra estetica ed etica, Mimesis, 
Milano 2003, p. 81. 
3«I walk towards language – the expression sounds as if language were a long way 
from us, in some place, where in order to reach we would need to start walking. But is 
it really necessary to reach language? According to an ancient tradition, we ourselves 
are beings that are able to speak and therefore already possess language. Man would 
not be man if he were not granted the power to speak, to say. Right from the beginning 
we are therefore in language and with language. Walking towards language is not 
necessary. Moreover, it is impossible, if it is true that we are already where it would 
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lead us. But are we there? We are in language so as to express its real being, so as to 
think it as language, in the act of. Listening to what is peculiar or typical of it, are we 
able to prerceive it? We already abide, without our own cooperation, in the proximity of 
language», M. HEIDEGGER, Unterwegs zur sprache, Pfullingen, Neske 1959, p. 189. 
4 «The word carries the whole idea and becomes itself an idea», ID., Manuscrits, vol. 
VII , Le Visible et l’invisible Notes de prèparation , f. 203, in D. DE LEO,  La relazione 
percettiva. La musica. Merleau-Ponty e la musica,cit., p. 21. 
5«Using external signs to bring to life in others’ spirits a conception that is in the author. 
Two thinking subjects and some signs», ID., Manuscrits, vol. III La Prose du monde. 
Notes de prèparation, f.  210, in Ibidem. 
6 Cfr. for further detail S. SALVATORE, M. SCOTTO DI CARLO, L’intervento psicologico per 
la scuola. Modelli, metodi, strumenti, Ed. Carlo Amore, Roma 2005, pp. 89 e ss. 
7 «For too long the philosophers have assumed that the task of an “assertion” can only 
be to “describe” a certain state of things, or to “expound some fact”, which must be 
done in a true way or a false one. Scholars of grammar have actually pointed out 
regularly that not all “sentences” are (used to make) assertions: traditionally, as well as 
assertions (of the grammarians), there are also questions and exclamations, and 
utterances expressing orders or desires or connections. […] Not all true or false 
assertions are descriptions », J. AUSTIN, How to Do things with Words, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford-New York 1962, pp. 7-8. 
8 Prompted by Austin’s analysis, Searle developed the notion of language act in a 
formulation that is close to Frege’s model, distinguishing not between locutionary and 
illocutionary act, but betweeen illocutionary force and propositional content. Cfr. J. 
SEARLE, Expression and Meaning, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1979. 
9 «To say “I will do” can be to promise, or to express an intention, or foresee my future. 
E so on. […]. So when we say “I will do” we can clarify that we are making a prediction 
by adding the adverbs “undoubtedly” or “probably”, that we are expressing an intention 
by adding the adverbs “certainly” or “decidedly”, or that we are promising by adding the 
adverbial phrase “without fail”, or by saying “I’ll do my best”», J. AUSTIN, How to Do 
things with Words, cit., p. 59. 
10 The real puzzle of volition lies in the overlapping of intention and the onset of action. 
So voluntary intention is analysed in three steps: “wanting to”, “starting to do”, and 
lastly “doing”.  In this perspective what comes into play is not only the dichotomy  
between passivity and activity: the notion of action is not just distinguished from 
passivity, in that activity itself has two opposites, not only movement as an event, but 
also the subject’s passivity. In analysing the cause, one discovers a sense which 
cannot be linked either to a constant antecedent or to an active power, but is the 
passive counterpart of power.  Assigning a desire as the motive does not mean 
attributing a reason. But knowing an intention means knowing the reasons, and things 
no longer proceed in this way when the sphere of passivity is taken into consideration. 
Factors of “disposition” are then introduced, which cannot be reduced to the “reasons 
for”. The ultimate difficulty of the theory of action therefore lies in the relation between 
“disposition for” and “power to”. An act is what can be carried out or done, begun, 
taken up again, carried on, interrupted. The act is the ‘I can’ of ‘I think’. So the “fact” is 
no longer simply the observable, but the completed work, brought to light by language. 
 
